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Robert M. Cover was born in Boston in 1943. He received his B.A.
from Princeton University in 1965 and his LL.B. from Columbia Law
School in 1968. He taught at Columbia from 1968 to 1971 and was a
visiting senior lecturer in law and American studies at the Hebrew Uni-
versity in Jerusalem from 1971 to 1972. In 1972 he joined the faculty of
Yale Law School. In 1982 he was named Chancellor Kent Professor of
Law and Legal History.
Professor Cover married Diane Bornstein Cover in 1967 and had a son,
Avi, and a daughter, Leah. He is also survived by his brother, Arnold
Cover, and his parents, Martha and Jacob Cover. The following ad-
dresses were delivered at the Memorial Service for Professor Cover at the
Yale Law School on Sunday, September 14, 1986.
Guido Calabresit
We are here to commemorate a life well led. We are here not so much to
grieve (we need no special event or occasion for that) as to remind our-
selves of those things that made Bob so special to each of us-that being
reminded, we may all try to be better, more full of passion and compas-
sion, more demanding of ourselves and understanding of others,
and-most of all-less full of cant and hypocrisy, those twin temptations
to which the academy is so prone.
I loved Bob because he was a wonderful, dear, and loyal friend, but I
also loved him because he represented all that we strive to be. He was a
superb scholar-there are none better: wide ranging, original, daring, a
bit mad even, but always wise. And yet he knew how useless, how sinful
scholarship is without character. He was a passionate activist. And yet he
understood instinctively how destructive passion can be if it does not for-
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give and even love those individuals on whom it must-on whom it
must-turn its fire. He was deeply devoted to his heritage. And yet he
never let its great traditions exclude others, but made of them a light for
all peoples and a searing criticism of injustice everywhere, within as well
as without.
These qualities made him a wonderful teacher, of course. What made
him even more was not only that he genuinely loved and supported his
students but also that, since he did not have a pompous bone in his body,
he never, ever patronized them.
He loved this school, with all its faults, because of its commitment to
scholarship and decency, its abhorrence of rules, and its insane, but utterly
wise, reliance on individual good will to keep it going. He understood
immediately the anarchy and good faith that are essential to this place,
and immediately made this place his own.
He was not falsely modest. That, like pomp, is an all too common aca-
demic sin. No, he knew full well how extraordinarily able he was. He just
knew how relatively unimportant even truly great ability is.
I will miss all of these qualities of Bob more than I can express. But
most of all, I think, I will miss his wry and always gentle sense of the
absurd-the look, the smile, that told me again and again, "Don't you see
what nonsense, what vanity, it all is?" and at the same time was so under-
standing of why humans have to persevere in such vanities. It is that smile
which I see, which I seek, when I ask how he would have dealt with an
issue, a problem I face. It is that gentle smile which chides me even now
and says, "That's nice, but don't overdo it."
He was my friend. He taught me much much more than he ever knew.
His life was cruelly short, but ultimately even that fact will fade, and
what will remain, untouched and untouchable, in the words of the spiri-
tual-"bright shining as the sun"-is a life supremely well led.
Michael J. Graetzt
I knew, of course, of Bob Cover's first heart attack, and I know, in my
mind at least-as we all do-that death may come to anyone at any time,
but the suddenness of Bob's death was such a shock. There are the plans
for shared times ripped asunder, classes untaught, meals uneaten, conver-
sations unfinished-so many things not yet begun. I had expected three
t Justus S. Hotchkiss Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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and a half decades, not three and a half years, with Bob Cover, and to be
robbed of that makes me immeasurably poorer and inconsolably sad.
What a stunning loss to all of his family and friends. What an awesome
blow to Leah, to Avi, and to Diane, who together were the core of Bob's
life.
Bob Cover was such a special person. So many among us have failed to
develop a clear vision by which to know ourselves, against which to mea-
sure ourselves. We are tempted to shape ourselves according to the society
that contains us: to match our scholarship to today's vogue, to conform our
professional and personal lives to the dominant fashions of the day, to
allow our tastes for material comforts to determine our visions of right
and wrong, to emasculate our sense of justice. Bob Cover did none of these
things.
Bob had a remarkable and mature sense of himself. His system of val-
ues was fully developed. He was secure about where he stood and wholly
unthreatened by the knowledge that there were realms best left entirely to
others. He knew what parts of himself he could yield to the obligations of
professional position, what parts to the entreaties of friends, and what
greater part to save for his family, for those he truly loved-for Diane,
Avi, and Leah.
Bob Cover seized life vigorously and in great variety. Bob's reactions to
ideas, to people, and to things were uniquely his-often unpredictable and
endlessly engaging. No person, for example, took greater delight in an
excellent meal than Bob. Yet the laws of Kashrut were to be obeyed. So
generally he kept kosher, but he insisted on abandoning those rules when-
ever they posed even a mild threat to friendship. "In a friend's house, you
eat what is served," he said. "Friendship is more important."
Bob's connection to modern culture often seemed haphazard. Credit
cards he understood fully; cameras detracted from the process of seeing.
When our students in a seminar entitled "The Constitution and the
Code" relabeled it "The Constitution and the Starship Enterprise," Bob
was puzzled. "What," he asked, "is the Starship Enterprise?"
He knew, of course, of Bob Dylan and the Beatles, but the music of his
generation seemed largely to have skipped him by. Perhaps, had he lived,
this would not have been the case with the music of Avi and Leah's gener-
ation. He had little taste for it at first, though as in all things, he knew
what he liked. He took instantly to Cyndi Lauper's "She Bop"-a song
Bob described as the one that conjugated the verb "to bop." And not long
ago he remarked at a law school faculty workshop that MTV-through
its anarchy, its challenge to established values-gave him confidence that
the First Amendment was alive and well.
Bob was even more firm in his views about books. He was as quick to
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urge upon you Elmore Leonard, Rex Stout, or Bill James-all of whom
he regarded as superb authors-as Robert Alter's The Art of Biblical
Narrative. On the other hand, Bob maintained that many books worth
beginning were not worth finishing and insisted that he had never met a
British novel worth reading.
Bob was a loyal and forgiving man. Although he was quite bitter about
a few trades, no one could take greater pleasure than Bob would have in
the current nine-game first-place lead of the Boston Red Sox.
Bob had a marvelous sense of humor. He found great humor, not hero-
ism, when he was required to respond recently, in filling out an applica-
tion to become a member of the New York State Bar, that yes, he had
been a party to litigation-Cover v. New York State Bar, his challenge to
its loyalty oath.
Bob's scholarship provides ample, extensive, and ongoing evidence of
his superb and subtle mind. His originality-even his quirki-
ness-emerges, as it did in conversation. I remember one class where we
were discussing the constitutionality of federal and state subsidies to pri-
vate schools, including private religious schools. To Bob, that posed no
serious constitutional issue. Rather, he insisted, it is when the state itself
engages in education-it is public education-that threatens the individ-
ual liberty guaranteed by the Constitution.
Memories of Bob teaching are among my most vivid, for Bob Cover
was a teacher through and through. He approached the class-
room-whether here or at Leah's school-with a great sense of adventure.
For Bob the classroom was not a performance hall; conveying his knowl-
edge or beliefs to others was only one, relatively small part of teaching.
Teaching, to Bob, was a process of communal learning-the classroom a
place where people with mutual respect learn together. Talmudic conver-
sation was his model. He was willing to teach any subject, even taxation,
as a way to learn it.
For Bob, teaching and learning were not limited to the classroom. He
was unwavering in his commitment to the students' shanties in Beinecke
Plaza because he was confident about their educational value to the stu-
dents and to the community as a whole. After Avi and Leah had spent
some time there one day, Bob remarked that they had now at last had a
genuine learning experience on the Yale University campus. And al-
though he felt confident that he would abhor their politics, he was looking
forward to welcoming the next group of students who would appear
there-the process of education would continue.
Respect for others was the hallmark of Bob Cover's teaching, whether
to the students in his class, to business managers in China, or at home at
the Passover table.
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It was no accident that Bob became a teacher of law, rather than a
teacher of, say, history or Chinese studies. For Bob Cover had an acute
and abiding commitment to justice-a sense of justice forged early in his
life in the courtrooms of Albany, Georgia, and fixed in the jail in Ameri-
cus. He knew it is in law that the hope for justice resides, in the teaching
of law that a sense of justice might be awakened and perhaps nurtured.
Although he had a healthy regard for the value of theory, Bob was con-
vinced that only by thinking and writing about justice, by teaching about
justice, by creating and maintaining a just workplace, indeed by providing
justice to its community and to society, could a law school claim to be
great.
His sensibility about and commitment to justice pervaded Bob's
life-and not only in the obvious places-his scholarship and teaching.
His relationships with others were invariably just. Only love for family
and friends-most especially love for Leah, Avi, and Diane-had a
greater place in Bob Cover's life.
We have come together here today to remember Robert Cover. Despite
its institutional quality, even its starkness, this is a fitting place. It is not
Bob's first place, not his home, but this law school was one of Bob's im-
portant places. I think of him every time I enter this building. I search for
his open door-I look, still hoping once again to glimpse his bicycle every
time I step onto his hall. I always will. Bob's spirit, his good humor, his
twinkling eyes, his ready ear, his unique and subtle intelligence, his com-
passion, his gentle patience, his open door have been such an important
part of my few years here.
Arthur Leff's law dictionary reports that J.A. MacLachan "impiously
but usefully" defined an act of God as 'that which no reasonable God
would do.' " It is little comfort to know that Bob's death, as surely as
Arthur's own, was an act of God. It does nothing to assuage the overpow-
ering sense of loss. We shall all miss this wise and sweet and gentle man.
Barbara A. Blackt
When you are asked to speak at such a service as this for a dearly loved
friend, you think about what to say, and at some point you may realize,
with great distress, that you are working at writing a speech. I don't want
to make a speech about Bob. Bob himself was very good at not making
t Dean, Columbia University School of Law.
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speeches when he spoke. He told stories, usually about storytellers and
their stories; he was a born storyteller, and therefore a born teacher, and a
born historian.
It was, of course, legal history that brought, or threw, us together.
When we began our relationship Bob was, to me, an obviously up-and-
coming young scholar in our mutual discipline. When it ended he was my
kid brother. So I'll speak for a while about Bob, but I won't make a
speech.
I did do a little legal-historical research of my own for today: Bob was,
as you know, an alumnus of the Columbia Law School, and so I knew
that there were people there who knew him when he was very young, and
I thought there might be some pieces of paper as well that would tell me
something about the twenty-two-year-old who came to Columbia in 1965.
I asked my colleague Lou Henkin-to whom Bob was, I knew, very
dear-just to say a bit about that young man, and Lou said:
He was very sweet, pink-cheeked, lovable, irreverent but never
acerbic. When he disagreed with you, you loved him for it. Going
from one side of the podium to the other without a moment in be-
tween, Bob was immediately accepted by the faculty as a colleague.
He was close to the students, and, in the difficult days of the late
sixties, defended the voice of freedom and reason in faculty councils.
Bob, then, in his early and mid-twenties, was Bob as I knew him later.
And in documentary confirmation of this, I found some words of Bob's,
written when he applied for admission to law school in 1965:
My scholastic achievements are perhaps most relevant to my abil-
ity to study law effectively. These achievements should be clear from
my transcript and recommendations. I shall only state that I have
always been what is considered a good student. I have made no ex-
traordinary achievement in scholarship, but have relied on my natu-
ral abilities with intermittent work to maintain a fairly high scholas-
tic average. Scholarship, however, is not my major concern. I am far
more interested in the uses to which knowledge can be put than in
the pursuit of knowledge itself. It is in the area of utilization of
knowledge that my achievements have been, to me, most important if
least tangible.
For the past several years my two major interests have been insti-
tutional change and character education. I view these two areas as
prerequisites for the type of societal change that I would like to see
brought about in the future.
I worked for nine months for the Student Nonviolent Coordinat-
ing Committee (SNCC) in Southwest Georgia. I cannot point to
achievements that can be branded as my own, but I can point to
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important achievements of the SNCC project of which I was a part.
Two major breakthroughs were made in Terrell County, Georgia
while I was working there. In November 1963, thirty Negroes regis-
tered to vote in Dawson, Ga.-more than twice as many as had reg-
istered in any one month previous to that time. In February 1964,
more than fifty Negroes were registered in that same county, over
forty on one day. These concrete achievements were the result of
three federal injunctions, one bombing, the dangerous and difficult
work done by my predecessors, and the work of a small group of
people of which I was only one member. I can claim but a minute
part of the achievement.
In March 1964, I worked as a local liaison with the National
Sharecroppers' Fund in setting up the first conference of Negro
small farmers and sharecroppers in southwest Georgia with repre-
sentatives of federal and state agencies. The purpose of the confer-
ence was to familiarize local people with government programs from
which they might benefit. Again, the achievement belongs to a group
of people in which I was but one member.
My interest in character education has manifested itself in my job
during the summer of 1964 as a senior counselor at Camp Ramah in
the Poconos, a camp run by the Jewish Theological Seminary, and
in my present job as a teacher in the religious school of the Princeton
Jewish Center. It is difficult to even guess at the extent to which I
have achieved success in my work as an educator. On entirely subjec-
tive criteria I would maintain that several youngsters have been posi-
tively influenced by their experience as my students or counselees.
On a more objective level I can relate one of the projects that I
initiated and administered at Camp Ramah. Our unit of eighty chil-
dren took part in a "work day" in which they painted, cleaned, and
fixed up a community center in an underprivileged section of Scran-
ton, Pennsylvania. The project consisted of orientation, work, work-
shops led by the social worker in charge of the center, and post-
project evaluation. The campers began to realize the nature and ex-
tent of the problem of poverty in urban areas.
I apologize for the vagueness of this essay. However, you have or
will have the measurements of all my relevant, measurable achieve-
ments. I have tried, here, to give some idea of my real concerns and
of the way in which I have tried to achieve something in the realm of
those concerns.
And then I found a document in further confirmation of the young Bob
having been the Bob I knew. This was a document of particular signifi-
cance to me. In explanation of that point, I must tell you first that Bob
and I taught legal history together, and that one of the great things about
teaching with Bob was that however disorganized (considerably) I was, he
was more so; however close (very) I ran to deadlines, he ran closer (if not
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beyond); if I lost (frequently) one document, he lost two. It was very re-
laxing and utterly endearing. Imagine, then, my reaction on reading this:
July 9, 1965
Admissions Office
Columbia University School of Law
435 West 116th Street
New York, N.Y.
Dear Sir,
I have received a memorandum to the effect that you have not, as
yet, received my college card and photograph. Unfortunately, I have
misplaced the card that was sent along with this memorandum. I do
intend to enroll in the entering class of the law school in September
of 1965. If this letter is not sufficient confirmation of my intention,
please send me another card and I will send it back to you immedi-
ately. I am presently working away from home and do not have a
suitable photograph. I can, however, have a photograph in your of-
fice within a week or ten days. Please accept my apologies for my
carelessness in this matter.
Thank you very much.
Sincerely yours,
Robert M. Cover
(If you are imagining that my reaction was to cry, you are right.)
If a scholar is learned, erudite, his scholarship will be learned, erudite;
if a scholar is brilliant, his scholarship will be brilliant; if a scholar has a
masterful command of language, his scholarship will be powerfully writ-
ten. All scholarship, that is, inevitably reveals something about the
scholar. But some more than most. Because Bob chose to write about those
things that were of deepest concern to him, his work-his learned, erudite,
brilliant, powerfully written work-is, more than most, eloquent of what
was most deeply true about the person who was the scholar who did the
writing. This was true of his first major work, the book that made him
immediately an important figure in legal history, and even more true of
his last. In the early book, made aware, as he tells us, of the complexity of
moral choice, Bob poses and explores the dilemma of the anti-slavery
judge, Captain Vere's dilemma, the moral-formal dilemma as he calls it.
By the last writings, although still focusing on the role of judges, on the
dilemma of judges, Bob was more clearly speaking about the dilemma of
each and every one of us: To quote him somewhat out of context, "we
must wade in to understand our own dilemma." Moreover, while in the
earlier work understanding was the main object for Bob, and statement of
his own position, of his own choice, is muted, in the later work Bob's
position comes through loud and clear.
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Still, the message has been there, and the same, all along. It was there
in the late sixties when, as Lou Henkin said, Bob spoke for freedom and
reason. As Bruce Ackerman put it, when I asked him if he would care to
put into words, for me to convey here, something of what he feels about
Bob, "At all times he spoke with the same voice-passionate in its com-
mitment to justice, resonant in its mastery of the deepest resources of the
law." The voice, of course, was a profoundly radical voice; it was also
profoundly sane. As Bruce also said, "In the best of times such a voice is
irreplaceable. When the law is sounding a retreat from the great themes
to which Bob gave his life, his silence speaks yet more eloquently to the
rest of us."
Among legal historians, who counted Bob one of theirs, there is much
sorrow. Next month the American Society for Legal History will hold its
annual meeting in Toronto. At these meetings we counted on Bob to be
there, and he often was. Most especially, the smaller circle of those of us
who were Bob's close friends, who tended at meetings to stay together, to
dine and drink together, to discuss papers together, to watch the World
Series instead of going to receptions together, to swell (or constitute) the
audience at each other's panels, we counted on Bob to be there, and for us
Toronto will be the place where we share our overwhelming sense of
loss-as, here in New Haven, Bob's Yale colleagues share their over-
whelming sense of loss, with Bob's family and other friends.
I am deeply grateful to have been asked to participate, to have been
allowed today to say a few words about my dear friend, Bob Cover.
Stephen Wizner-
I remember the first time I saw Bob Cover. It was exactly twenty years
ago, in the midst of the War on Poverty, during Bob's first year of law
school. A small group of activist lawyers were hiding out at the Columbia
Law School, trying to change the world. They were called, somewhat
grandly, the Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law.
One day a very earnest, somewhat shy first-year law student appeared
in our office and announced that he had come to help us help the poor.
He asked for a research task-something difficult-something we were
struggling with. He didn't want just to go look something up. He wanted
to work on a major theoretical problem we faced in our law reform effort.
t Director of Clinical Studies and Professor (Adjunct) of Law, Yale Law School.
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We were a little amused by the intellectual temerity and refreshing
naivetXe of this first-year student. We told him, rather dubiously, that we
were having difficulty constructing a legal theory that would enable us to
challenge arbitrary actions by local welfare departments in federal court.
(Remember, this was 1966, before Goldberg v. Kelly.)
We were not surprised when we did not see Bob again for a week, or
perhaps a little longer. We were surprised when he returned with a very
long manuscript, entitled "Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Prac-
tices." It was a creative analysis and synthesis of constitutional law, the
Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts, and federal jurisdiction. It described
what would prove to be a successful theory for overcoming the combined
obstacles of exhaustion and abstention. It was to become Bob's Note for
the Columbia Law Review and the major theoretical underpinning for our
campaign of welfare law test cases in the federal courts. It was an intellec-
tual tour de force. But more important, it seems to me in retrospect, was
the personal commitment and idealism that produced that remarkable
document.
Not long afterward, in Albany, Georgia, C.B. King, a veteran black
civil rights lawyer, talked to me about Bob Cover. King had gained na-
tional prominence as attorney for the Albany Movement, organized by the
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. He recalled the SNCC
workers, especially the students who had come down from the North to
help integrate the South. He talked about one student in particular, an
earnest, polite, Princeton undergraduate. Bob had been in Albany, Geor-
gia as a SNCC volunteer. He was arrested in a civil rights demonstration.
He spent weeks in jail, where he went on a hunger strike and was beaten
by other prisoners.
King had been touched by Bob, by his sincerity, his unpretentiousness,
and his courage. And Bob was inspired by C.B. King, a lawyer who
viewed law as a moral force for achieving a just world. Bob often said that
that experience in Georgia with C.B. King was a major influence in his
deciding to become a lawyer.
In 1962 Bob was a nineteen-year-old sophomore at Princeton. Those
were the days of compulsory chapel attendance, no student cars on cam-
pus, and the honor system. That year 700 members of Bob's class "bick-
ered"-sought admission to Princeton's elite eating clubs. Two of the
700-Bob was not one of them-were not invited to join a club. The
Daily Princetonian of December 17, 1962, contained what may have been
Bob's first publication. It is well written, argumentative, ironic, infused
with moral sensibility. It is about human dignity and community. Though
it was written nearly twenty-five years ago, in it you can hear Bob's voice.
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Our hallowed university presumes, in certain instances, to stand
"in loco parentis," in the place of our parents. It appears that we
Princeton "men" are as yet unable to make certain ethical and moral
decisions on our own. We may not decide whether or not we shall go
to church, drive a car, or cheat on tests.
However, it is not the purpose of this letter to dispute the right of
the university to place these restrictions on us. Certainly, a great deal
of our behavior indicates that it is advisable to treat us as boys rather
than men.
Let us put all these considerations aside and proceed to the ques-
tion of how good a parent the university really is. For, once the uni-
versity pretends to stand "in loco parentis" as the caretaker of our
morals, she must inevitably make a decision as to what she will su-
perintend and what she will leave alone. It is in this decision that
our new parent fails miserably.
Our parent tells us to go to church. But, if there is one precept
about which practically every religion agrees, it is that consideration
for and sensitivity to one's fellow man is of the utmost importance.
Our parent, through the honor system, has set up a standard of in-
tellectual integrity to which we must adhere. Yet, the intellect is not
an end in itself. It is a tool for living in the world of men. Indeed,
modern psychology and religion agree, if on no other point, on the
assumption that an individual's personality is a sensitive phenome-
non, delicately balanced and subject to easy bruising.
Now, isn't it fine that our foster parent is supporting such valua-
ble things as religion and intellect? Isn't it a shame that our new
parent refuses to recognize the consequences of religious and intellec-
tual findings when applied to Princeton's social life? Religion
teaches us consideration for our fellow man; psychology teaches us
that the adolescent is extremely sensitive to peer group rejection.
Moreover, anthropology and sociology have taught us that man can
devise and has devised a variety of social systems which can either
minimize or maximize the stresses on the individual.
Yet, we persist in a social system, the club system, which in 1962
rejected two individuals out of a group of more than 700 who bick-
ered. Apply the findings of psychology to this case!
Finally, apply the philosophy upon which the American tradition
is based, the philosophy which states uncompromisingly the worth of
the individual in a pluralistic society. Could we not, with all our
academic knowledge of social structure, devise a better way to choose
the people with whom we will eat our meals and share our parties?
But our mother remains silent. She recognizes the right of mere
boys who are presumably incapable of deciding whether or not they
may drive a car or go to church to pass judgment on their peers and
to trample upon the sensitivities of individuals.
The passion for justice and the concern for how members of a commu-
1709
The Yale Law Journal
nity ought to treat one another expressed in these eloquent words of a
nineteen-year-old student were themes of Bob's life. Years later, at a po-
litical demonstration outside the Criminal Court building in Foley Square
in lower Manhattan, a young Columbia law professor stood on the roof of
a car, speaking into a battery-powered megaphone. It was Bob Cover,
protesting the prosecution of black radicals on conspiracy charges.
And this was no isolated excess of youthful idealism. At Yale we saw
the mature Bob Cover conducting a teach-in with students seeking divest-
ment of University funds from South Africa, walking picket lines in sup-
port of Yale workers seeking better wages and working conditions, work-
ing with a group of law students trying to help the homeless in New
Haven.
Bob had an abiding concern for community, for how individuals and
groups express themselves and relate to each other. For him friendship
was both a personal, intimate reality, and a metaphor for a good society
and a just world.
Bob cared deeply about his family. He was a devoted husband and fa-
ther, son and brother. Diane and Avi and Leah shared Bob's commitment
to the family as loving friends who support each other and relate to one
another with kindness and understanding. One had only to see Bob and
Diane and the children together to appreciate the extraordinary possibili-
ties of the family for developing and sustaining relationships of love and
respect.
Friday night sabbath dinner at the Covers' home on Colony Road was
a joyous occasion of ritual observance, excellent food, and good conversa-
tion. Everyone participated, especially the children, in animated discussion
of Jewish issues, education, community events and personalities, and base-
ball. Bob was so happy in that setting, with Diane and Avi and Leah,
sharing the special quality of their family with friends.
Bob was a committed Jew. He experienced fully the halacha and ag-
gadah, the nomos and narrative, the myth, law, and history, the ethical
aspirations, of the Jewish people. Every Saturday morning he would
stride into the synagogue, wrapped in his multicolored prayer shawl, an
oversized, colorful skull cap perched on his head, a huge volume of Tal-
mud under his arm, and a friendly grin on his face as he greeted the
"regulars."
On Saturday afternoons he would sit with a group of neighbors and
they would study a page of Talmud together. Bob was no solitary reli-
gious mystic. His Judaism, like the rest of his life, reflected his concern
for community.
Bob defined his role as a teacher at Yale as membership in a commu-
nity, a community of students and teachers, workers and scholars. Teach-
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ing was not performance, but a relationship-an engagement-with stu-
dents, in which ideas were expressed and discussed and taken seriously,
and teacher and students treated each other with respect and friendship.
Membership in the University community meant more than teaching
and scholarship. It meant engagement of the University administration in
support of workers and students organizing to protest injustice in the
workplace or evil in the world.
At the end of his life Bob was working on a sixteenth-century Hebrew
text that recorded a dispute between the rabbis of Safed and the rabbis of
Jerusalem over an attempt to reinstate the ordination of judges, which
rabbinic tradition held would accompany the coming of the messianic age.
The confluence of religion, law, and politics in this, Bob's last scholarly
project, was a summation of his vision of law as a sacred art, a bridge
from reality to a new world.
Bob Cover lived in this world, even as he dreamed of better worlds. He
fought for social justice. He practiced loving kindness. He was a teacher
and friend to all of us.
David Brion Davist
On occasions like this we tend to divide a human life in accordance
with the compartmentalizations of our society. We view Bob Cover as a
teacher, a legal scholar, a historian, a friend, an activist, a father and
husband, a Jew. While this approach allows us to see the rich multiform-
ity of a man who was loved and esteemed in a variety of roles, we should
also recognize the extraordinary integration and coherence of Bob's life.
This wholeness or "sphericity," to use Emerson's apt word, stood as a
challenge to an age when so many professional lives are fractured by inde-
cisiveness in the face of competing obligations, desires, and demands.
When I think of Bob Cover I think of the words "center," "centered,"
"centrality." His clear sense of priorities, ranging from his family to his
teaching and scholarly investigations, rested on an almost physical grasp
of the centralities of life. This anchor of assurance freed Bob from both
the arrogance and the humility that arise from deep-rooted self-doubt. For
many of us here, he himself became a center-a dependable source of
wisdom, sanity, clear-minded judgment; above all, a model of what caring
for other people really means.
t" Sterling Professor of History, Yale University.
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Bob Cover loathed hierarchical organization and especially the pretense
that accompanies rank, office, and artificial distinction. For Bob the law
was far too precious and central to human existence to be monopolized by
legislators, judges, law firms, law schools, or a legal profession. Since law
involves the most fundamental quest for norms, for determining the mean-
ing of right and wrong, a quest for what he called a "juster justice," he
was willing to assert that the Mennonite understanding of the First
Amendment deserves equal or superior status to that of Supreme Court
justices. Similarly, history for Bob was not simply another academic disci-
pline, a distribution requirement for a well-rounded life. He knew that
human life itself is incomprehensible without constant historical inquiry
that leads to the interpretation and reinterpretation of the past.
Bob was an exemplary teacher precisely because he never dreamed of
confining pedagogy within classroom walls. His social and political activ-
ism was an organic extension of his scholarship and intellectual beliefs.
He never regarded his home as a compartmentalized retreat from the
mental rigors of law school. He knew that the family is the seedbed of all
education, religion, and law, the locus of our first discovery of what he
termed "personal otherness." And it was this unfolding discovery of the
implications of personal otherness that lay at the heart of Bob's quest for
meaning in both law and life.
I could speak at length about Bob's professional skill and vision as a
historian, but such a tribute would miss what was most important to him
as well as to me. Perhaps I can best illustrate my point about integration
and connectedness with a personal anecdote. My family and I have had
the good fortune of sharing Passover seders with the Covers. The 1985
service at their home was especially memorable because it merged reli-
gion, law, history, pedagogy, and sociability in a free-ranging discussion
of human slavery and freedom. In family rituals, as in his teaching, Bob
subordinated external forms to the things that really mattered. This was a
seder oriented to the children, to their expressiveness in Hebrew, and to
the levity and word play of songs. But as a teacher, a legal scholar, a
historian, a friend, an activist, a father and husband, and a Jew, Bob also
sought to further everyone's understanding of the rich symbolism of the
escape from Egyptian bondage.
Engaging everyone present at the table, Bob asked in his somewhat
playful Socratic fashion what it meant to be a slave. In what does slavery
truly consist? Were the Jews in Egypt really slaves? What did serving
"with rigor" mean? Why didn't they rebel? Why, after fleeing with
Moses, did some of the Hebrew murmur and wish they could return to
the security of Egyptian bondage? What is involved in being free? Can we
understand freedom without referring to slavery?
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These are the kinds of questions that Bob posed. He also ventured into
secular history, asking for other examples of enslavement and deliverance.
Even the children, the older ones at least, caught some sense of Exodus as
a paradigm of a recurring human experience. Without becoming pedantic,
Bob touched on the symbolic and metaphorical meanings of slavery and
redemption. A feast of celebration and remembrance also became an occa-
sion for communal reflection on the meaning of freedom and hence the
meaning of life. I was particularly impressed by the children's response to
this discourse.
Bob's empathy and rapport with children provides the key to an under-
standing of what unified his life. Children loved and respected him be-
cause he was never condescending and because he took their interests,
worries, ideas, and delights as seriously as any constitutional issue. Chil-
dren knew he was one of those extremely rare adults who actually listens.
They also knew that his attention was guided by love. And love was the
binding force that integrated the diverse social roles, the many Bob Covers
we knew. Scholarly works, he once said, "are but vanities without a life
into which they fit." He paid tribute to Diane, Avi, and Leah for sharing
and creating that life, and he affectionately welcomed those friends, stu-
dents, and colleagues who sailed to his shore and discovered there a fresh
continent of moral vision. It is that larger life, created by all our interac-
ions with Bob, that brings us here; and that life will endure.
Tanina Rostaint
Rabbi Joshua Ben Prachia said: "Find yourself a teacher. Acquire a
friend. And judge everyone with the scale weighed in his favor." In Bob
Cover, we found a teacher. We discovered a friend. By his example, we
learned to judge everyone with the scales weighed in her favor.
Being a student in a class taught by Bob Cover was a very special expe-
rience. He was not a performer; rather, he engaged us through his passion
for intellectual inquiry, for justice, and for a better world. In the first
lecture of American Legal History, he promised that we would "examine
law as a bridge, the normative space between reality and the world we
imagine we can build." He said, "we want to learn the gestures a commit-
ted person makes." With Bob we explored our commitments to law, to
our community, and to a just life. He taught us how the law could serve
t Class of 1987, Yale Law School.
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the project of tickun olam, the repair of the world, but also how the law
often functioned to rigidify the divisions of a world in disrepair.
We were struck by Bob Cover's gentleness, his kindness, his integrity,
and his humility. Bob never forgot what it is like to be a student. He
welcomed and seriously entertained every possibility we had to offer.
When a student asked a question, his usual response was, "That's a very
interesting question!" Then, by his answer, he would show us how the
question, which might have felt half-articulated to the student asking,
opened up a new horizon of ideas. In his first-term procedure class, Bob
would draw out the students who felt least comfortable with the unfamil-
iar assertive tone of lawyering. As a result, the atmosphere in his classes
was open and relaxed. Every line of inquiry was available for exploration.
The dignity he conferred on us, the respect with which he received us,
made us feel like full participants in the intellectual undertaking upon
which he had embarked.
During one American Legal History class, several students asked Bob
about the role of women in early immigration to the colonies. The next
day, after apologizing for his lack of knowledge and hasty research, he
went on to devote a whole lecture to the subject. Bob Cover often apolo-
gized when he couldn't remember some fact or had not anticipated some
question. This never ceased to amaze us, because of the breadth of knowl-
edge and depth of vision he displayed.
Outside the classroom, Bob was sometimes difficult to approach because
of his shyness-and ours. To engage him in conversation, we developed
different techniques. One method was to mention Ted Williams. This
never failed to elicit a passionate response: Bob would reel off Williams's
on-base average for every year he played with the Red Sox. Another tech-
nique was to bring up the subject of restaurants and food. One side of
Bob's personality that usually did not reveal itself was his tremendous
affection for good food. Finally, you could always ask him how many
miles he had recently ridden on his bicycle, which was usually parked in
the middle of his office. While normally exceedingly modest about his
achievements, such as the Ames prize, he was wont to engage in a display
of bravado when it came to his Century rides. Steve Wizner somehow
always managed to overhear these conversations and would stick his head
inside Bob's office to invite him to go for a twelve-mile run.
We understood why Bob Cover had his office in the middle of the cele-
bration of chaos that is the Yale Legal Services Organization. We knew
that it was more than personal fondness for the wise-cracking individual
who runs L.S.O. Bob conceived of his teaching as intimately related to
L.S.O.'s project to acquaint us with the moral complexities that attend the
commitment to legal practice in a world in disrepair. Bob taught us how
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the study of history serves the project of tickun olam. Exploring the diffi-
cult choices with which committed persons of the past were confronted
and learning their responses, their gestures, would prepare us to contend
with the choices that a person who imagines a better world necessarily
faces.
During one class of American Legal History, two years ago, we spent
some time discussing Brandeis's concurrence in Whitney v. California.
That is the opinion in which Brandeis appeals to the Founding Fathers'
vision of democracy, and in particular, to their understanding of the cen-
trality of free speech and deliberation for maintaining a free, democratic
society. Clyde Spillenger asked Bob whether Justice Brandeis's view of
history was not overly romantic, as Judge Bork had observed in a law
review article. This is what Bob answered:
Of course [Brandeis's view of history is romantic] . . . . If your view
of history isn't romantic, then there is no reason for history to have
any instructive power whatsoever . . . Why in the world would
you then use history as authority? If you have a critical view of his-
tory . . . . Beard's view [that] the Founding Fathers were a bunch
of money-grubbing people out for their own self-interest-why in
the world would we then care what the Founding Fathers wanted?
Why in the world should we then emulate them or in any way ...
view their acts as authoritative? We view the acts of history as au-
thoritative precisely because we read into that history that part of the
past which we choose to make authoritative, which we wish to
emulate.
At the last meeting of our American Legal History class, Bob lectured
in defense of Justice Murphy, who sat on the Supreme Court during the
1940's, and who was, to his mind, an undervalued judge. Bob's under-
standing of the significance of biography-or, as he called it, hero wor-
ship-emer-ges in this lecture. I think his words are worth repeating:
To my mind, in part, the question goes back . . . to "What would
Brandeis have done?". . [T]his . . . goes to the realm of what the
role of biography or hero worship is in this area. [It is] looking for
wise people to think about. I don't think Brandeis was infallible, but
I think he was committed and wise and I haven't found too many
failings yet. Since I think he was committed and wise, and surely
smart, it's . . . interesting to ask, would he have been with Frank-
furter or Murphy in these things? Now Brandeis does often write
more like Frankfurter. Brandeis does not typically . . . cut through
and say, "It's a simple moral question." There's more of that in
Murphy than there is in Brandeis. But Brandeis at his best-in
Whitney, in the dissent in Coronado Coal that never got published,
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• . . in the Olmstead dissent-there's a capacity for Brandeis to cut
through . . . which Murphy really does pick up on.
I have the feeling that Frankfurter got enthralled with the rhetoric
of self-restraint, which is an important part of Brandeis's judicial
philosophy. Brandeis himself needed it, because he was such an ac-
tive spirit . . . . It was hard for Brandeis to keep his nose out of
anything, and that was true really as a judge as well. . . so he had
to develop this spirit of self-restraint in some ways. But . . . for
Brandeis it dropped off fairly naturally, one might say inconsistently,
when points of value were at issue. . . . I think that that wasn't the
case with Frankfurter and Jackson . . . they were terribly ambiva-
lent about where they stood on most of the critical issues of their day.
Murphy was not; Murphy did know where he stood; and there is in
the development of the theories of judicial restraint in Frankfurter
and Jackson an elaboration of a supporting philosophy for their own
ambivalence.
What comes through to me from all this is that it really is impor-
tant, in a fundamental way, where judges stand on these issues
... . Critical intelligence is a kind of secondary characteristic that
operates to implement commitments, that operates to understand the
limits to them, that operates to qualify the complexity of the world
so that you know that you're not alone and that there are people
with other commitments, that all of that is part of your reality; it's
all there. But it really is a secondary characteristic that comes into
play from the point of commitment that you know and that you
understand.
Like his hero Brandeis, Bob Cover was an active spirit. Like Brandeis,
and like Murphy, he knew where he stood. He stood with justice. He
stood with virtue. He stood with Local 34 when it demanded that the
University recognize clerical and technical workers as full members of this
community. He stood with us, his students, when we took a stance to
protest the University's investments in South Africa.
We have lost Bob Cover. We can be thankful that our lives were
touched and changed by his. When we struggle with the difficult choices
that the future holds in store for us, we will be able to ask ourselves,
"What would Bob Cover have done?"
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Owen M. Fisst
It began in the summer of 1974, when I was supposed to move from
Chicago to Yale. No fool, I spent that summer in Washington, D.C.,
working on the impeachment. It was Irene who was in New Haven, un-
loading the crates, trying to convince the kids of the wonders of New Ha-
ven by discovering a new pizza restaurant each night, and living in the
Covers' third-floor apartment in Davenport College until our house was
ready. Bob was teaching at Georgetown that summer, and one evening I
took a break from my work to meet the Covers for ice cream and a walk.
Diane was with us and graciously feigned some interest in the conversa-
tion. Leah was not yet born, but Avi was there in his stroller. He made no
pretense. He fell asleep the moment Bob and I started talking about what
must have seemed the most boring of all subjects: procedure.
The walk was long and directionless. We must have covered every inch
of the Washington Mall, ten times over. Initially, the conversation focused
on the impeachment. Our immediate project was to revise the traditional
first-year procedure course, and Bob, the true iconoclast in this endeavor,
played with the idea of building a new course out of the proceeding then
closing in on Richard Nixon. It didn't seem to matter to Bob that the
presidential impeachment process had not been used for over a hundred
years and probably would not be used for another. Nor did it seem to
matter that an impeachment proceeding is the most rarefied form of legal
practice imaginable and professionally involves only a dozen or two law-
yers in the entire nation. We paused, however, because we were both
suckers for the "great case." Our preferred teaching method was to dwell
on a single case for a long, long time (some say for an entire semester),
using a single fact situation and a single legal encounter to explore the
deepest and hardest issues of the law. The Nixon impeachment had not
yet produced that kind of case, but the welfare rights movement had. We
soon hit on Goldberg v. Kelly, and when we did, meta-procedure (as the
students named it, to distinguish it from real procedure) was born. That
was 1974.
Our last conversation, just a few days before his death, was also on
procedure. We had changed our meeting place from the Washington Mall
to the streets of New Haven. Bob was wearing his favorite academic at-
tire-a tee shirt, blue shorts, and those funny little bicycle shoes. There
was ice cream, though this time only I indulged (I know I failed Bob
miserably when it came to one of his passions, baseball, but I listened
attentively and responded appropriately whenever he went on about
t Alexander M. Bickel Professor of Public Law, Yale Law School.
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Haagen-Dazs Vanilla.). Diane and the kids were not with us this time,
but they were very much part of the conversation. Bob seemed to have
committed to memory the camp letters from Leah and Avi. He relished
each detail and understood that the closing lines of their letters, "Take me
home," simply meant "Don't enjoy yourselves too much." Laughing, we
sketched in our minds a New Yorker cartoon to do the kids' ploy justice.
Bob also spoke of how truly special the past two weeks had been with
Diane, not that he didn't miss the children, which he truly did, but he
never realized, so he said, how much fun it would be to be able to go to
the movies any night of the week, or to go out to dinner with friends on
the spur of the moment, etc.-the great indulgences of a modern marriage.
Not completely certain about the import of the "Take me home" sentences
and whether the kids would consider another summer at camp, he won-
dered aloud how he and Diane might be able to recreate those two weeks.
Drawing on my vast experience (my children are just a little older), and
having learned to cope with my middle daughter's latest summer adven-
ture, I told him not to worry: After camp, there would be Santa Cruz.
Bob had a very strong sense of priorities and relevance. Diane, Avi, and
Leah occupied most of the conversation, and his love for his family in-
formed everything he did and said. But we had gotten together to discuss
procedure and managed to spend a few moments on the subject. Judith
Resnik joined the collaboration a few years back, and the three of us were
readying a casebook for publication. For the most part, this meant shrink-
ing 8,000 pages of material down to about 1,000 (although one helpful
colleague, knowing full well what editing meant for us, suggested that we
could save a lot of time by selling each copy of the book with luggage
wheels.) The most plausible candidate for editing was a massive school
desegregation case involving Coney Island. Over the years, Coney Island's
position in the book kept changing, and so did its length. In this draft,
Goldberg v. Kelly was Chapter 1 and Coney Island Chapter 2, but Coney
Island had grown to about 300 pages, and there were five other chapters
to account for. I was, of course, the problem, since I have been long com-
mitted to that now desperate task of trying to convince unsuspecting first-
year students that Coney Island is the ordinary, typical lawsuit.
Judi had given up on me. She knew I was hopeless and dispatched Bob
on the most delicate and difficult of diplomatic missions: He was supposed
to convince me that we should take a sentence, or maybe two, out of
Judge Weinstein's opinion. Obviously, no analytic point was in jeopardy,
but knowing Bob's weak spot, I pleaded with him: Could you imagine? A
generation of law students who knew nothing of the cooling sea breezes of
Brighton Beach or the fishing fleet of Sheepshead Bay? He looked at me
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sideways, with that knowing, impish smile, and we moved on to other
subjects.
No casebook ever served a more sublime purpose. My life with Bob
filled the years between these two summer walks, the first in Washington
in 1974 and the last in New Haven in July 1986, and it revolved around,
of all things, a casebook. We were trying to find a way to share with our
students some of the excitement we felt for procedure and, for that matter,
the law. The setting of our conversations shifted, from the streets to our
offices to the corridors of the law school to the faculty lounge and then on
to Rudy's for a gourmet lunch (tuna fish and a slice of onion, amidst the
pinball machines, Pacman, and the afternoon "soaps"), but no matter
what the place, Bob's brilliance and creativity broke through.
Like any truly creative spirit, Bob played with ideas. He was forever
trying new things out, and though, as he would be the first to admit, some
of his ideas were quite zany, everything Bob said and wrote startled and
amazed me. I was never quite sure when he was going to turn the world
upside down (as when he turned "redundancy" into a virtue), or when he
would breathe life into tired technicalities (as he did when he started talk-
ing about "the hermeneutics of jurisdiction"), or when he would make
reference to some remote and learned text (like MTV). His ideas were
always provocative, insightful, and totally original. To work with Bob was
to experience the special pleasures of being a student again, but now to
have the world's greatest teacher as your friend. Sometimes I would pinch
myself.
Bob was also uniquely passionate and uniquely committed. The time he
spent in Albany, Georgia in the early 1960's as part of the civil rights
movement was important to him, and he was quite proud of it-at times I
did not know which he regarded as the greater badge of honor, the three
weeks in jail or the Ames prize, but he wore all his badges modestly. Now
and then he would speak of his time with SNCC in Georgia, but not very
often, and then always in a casual, self-denying manner. Sometimes a
group of students happened to find out about it and would press him for
the war stories. Others of us might have seized the moment, but Bob put
them off, saying that he was just a kid then, many students had been part
of the movement, it was no big deal, etc. Occasions sometimes arose, how-
ever, when he just had to speak, in class or in print or on the streets, as
with the Local 34 strike or the South African protests. Then the depth
and intensity of his commitment became apparent to all who listened.
Bob began his academic career in the midst of the Vietnam War, and
turned to slavery and the abolitionist movement, the subject of Justice Ac-
cused, not as an idle academic exercise, but as a way of understanding the
judicial response to draft resistance. His first article was a review of a
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book on the slavery period by Richard Hildreth, entitled Atrocious
Judges: Lives of Judges Infamous as Tools of Tyrants and Instruments
of Oppression. Bob's career as a law teacher roughly coincided with the
tenure of Warren Burger as Chief Justice, and Bob ended his career on
the same note with which he began: Violence and the Word. In January
1984 we appeared together on an AALS panel on constitutional interpre-
tation, and I doubt I will ever forget Bob's opening sentence, or its pitch
or intensity (which, of course, he later blamed on me and my rhetorical
excesses): "Warren Burger is a violent man." Bob found the last fifteen
years of Supreme Court history to be "disgusting," to use a term he often
used to express disapproval-one of the few that he would have allowed
me to repeat in public-and he saw the decisions of the Burger Court as a
fair indication of what could be expected from the judiciary. The Warren
Court was something of a miracle.
Bob's passion was part of our collaboration and shaped that peculiar
scholarly endeavor, too. It no doubt accounted for his constant plea that
we give the students only Goldberg v. Kelly and ignore the intervening
fifteen years of Burger Court due process decisions, which, in effect, re-
duced Goldberg v. Kelly to a formal vestige of another era. Bob's passion
was remarkable and, together with his brilliance and creativity, constantly
infused the collaboration with a special excitement and made it the great
intellectual adventure that it was. But there was another quality of Bob's
that was probably even more remarkable and even more essential to the
collaboration. That was the way he handled disagreement. Bob not only
tolerated and respected disagreement, but oddly enough, seemed especially
engaged by it. Like Hannah Arendt and Michael Walzer and the other
great theoreticians of participatory democracy, Bob took a rare and un-
usual pleasure in disagreement, not because he was cantankerous-quite
the opposite-but because he recognized plurality as the essential feature
of the human condition.
There was much upon which we agreed. We were both drawn to pro-
cedure because it raised grand theoretical issues in a tough, technical con-
text and thus seemed to embody the essential tension of the law. We also
agreed on the aims of the first-year course and the kind of material to
which we wished to expose our students. We even shared some basic po-
litical values. Goldberg v. Kelly was no accidental hit; for us, it was the
culmination of the Golden Age of American Law. No collaboration can
survive without this kind of fundamental agreement, but the truth of the
matter is that we also disagreed, sometimes passionately, as anyone knows
who sat through a faculty meeting, who wandered into the faculty lounge
when we were trying to bring The Structure of Procedure to completion,
or who happened to read Nomos and Narrative. There is, to be sure, an
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egalitarian streak that runs through both our work, but there is also a
difference, as important a difference as that which divided SNCC and the
Department of Justice in the 1960s. Of course, the casebook format is
more congenial to disagreement than an article-trying to write an article
together that spanned Nomos and Narrative and Objectivity and Inter-
pretation would have required us to defy the law of the excluded middle.
But even so, a casebook requires decisions and choices-what to include or
exclude, how best to present an entire body of law, and what to say about
the material in the notes and commentary. Collaboration involves ex-
tending, developing, and refining what two people share in common, but
on a day-to-day basis, it also requires resolving differences.
Some people manage disagreement by giving in. Not Bob. Indeed, I
can't remember a single instance when Bob compromised a point or posi-
tion simply for the sake of going forward (my "flexibility" is well known).
What Bob did, however, was to listen, carefully and patiently, and then to
build on what we shared in common. Sometimes I would think we were
at different ends of the earth, but, according to Bob, we weren't really that
far apart. Bob brought to these arguments the intellectual gifts I spoke
about before, his brilliance, creativity, and immense learning, and though
they always dazzled, he was careful never to overwhelm-he gave me
room to breathe and to think. Sometimes he even went so far as to re-
spond to himself, by formulating the argument I wanted to make or
should have made. His words were precise, and instilled with such an
integrity and advanced with such a gentleness as to turn every argument
into a conversation. The initial difference was often resolved, but even
when it wasn't, when I turned to leave and walk away, I silently replayed
the conversation in my mind and often felt, deep, deep inside, that maybe
Bob was right.
Surrender was, of course, possible, but with Bob that was a little tricky.
Early this spring, Judi, Bob, and I met in New Haven to go through the
casebook once again, and a disagreement arose over a technical issue in-
volving TRO's (Does the issuance of a show cause order transform the
TRO into a preliminary injunction?). This was an area I was supposed to
know something about, and though I tried to ride my authority, both Bob
and Judi remained unconvinced. A few weeks later, in the midst of the
South African protests, Bob called late one evening to discuss the applica-
tion for a TRO that was being prepared for the students who were sus-
pended. He wanted me to join that application, and as he went over the
legal papers that were being drafted, the same technical issue arose again.
This time, however, remembering the sense of uneasiness with which I
ended the previous conversation, I had the good sense to surrender: "Any-
thing you decide is fine with me. Just sign my name." Others would have
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moved on from there, but not Bob. He seemed a little disappointed. It was
well after eleven, but he seemed to want to continue the discussion, in a
relaxed and casual way, as though we had stumbled upon one another in
the corridor early one morning (in most instances that meant the
day-Bob was the greatest schmoozer in the history of the Yale Law
School). On the technical TRO issue, Bob still thought I was wrong and
was quite clear about that, but he knew I attached great importance to the
point, and he wanted to make sure I was totally comfortable with the way
he resolved it. I promised to review the papers the next morning.
In speaking of our collaboration and the remarkable qualities Bob
brought to it, I have drawn on my personal experiences and shared with
you the intimacies, so to speak, of our relationship. But since Goldberg v.
Kelly meant all things to us at all times, my hunch is that these exper-
iences are not personal to me but are common experiences. Bob was not a
public person, in the sense that he did not thrust himself upon you; he
started new relationships slowly and shyly. But the truth of the matter is
he had lots of collaborators-Steve Wizner, Michael Graetz, Barbar,
Black, Judith Resnik, Alvin Klevorick, Peter Schuck, Barbara Under-
wood, and Leon Lipson-all exploring one aspect or another of Goldberg
v. Kelly, though sometimes under the heading of Jewish Law, Organiza-
tional Structures of Procedural Systems, American Legal History, Human
Capital, etc. There were many, many sides to Bob, maybe more than to
any other member of the faculty, but it was always the same Bob-not
just brilliant, but a rare and remarkable combination of passion and toler-
ance. His love for disagreement, and his unique capacity to see beyond it
and to respect those with whom he disagreed, even passionately, were evi-
dent to his colleagues and students and formed an essential part of their
relationship with him. I also believe that this particular facet of his char-
acter and personality is the key to his scholarship and, for that matter, his
entire jurisprudence. Bob distrusted the state and proclaimed himself an
anarchist-in, as he put it, the classical sense-because of the state's ca-
pacity to close off argument and to impose its view through the use of
force. In that sense, judges are people of violence.
Bob's death is a loss we all share. It will be felt in the lecture halls and
in the law journals of the nation. Procedure, or for that matter any subject
that might have engaged him, will never be what it could have been. An-
archism never had a more eloquent spokesman. But however great these
losses are, and they truly are great, they seem trivial compared to the
losses suffered by those who knew the joys of his presence and by those
who loved him. In the days since his death, I have often thought of our
times together-those long, aimless walks and the ice cream. These were
the grand moments of academic life, conversations about ideas that we
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believed truly mattered, infused and inspired by a love that brought to our
work a certain playfulness.
I know I am supposed to be grateful for what I had, for those ten or
twelve years, and I am. But I wanted them to go on and on and
on-maybe not forever, for that would be asking too much, but at least
long enough for us to grow old together, for there to be another decade or
two of long walks, and for me someday, somehow to find that strength I
needed but always seemed to lack, until it was too late, to tell Bob all that
he meant to me.
James Ponett
We have heard words spoken about Bob Cover, and we have heard
words that Bob Cover spoke. What remains for us is to hear words that
Bob heard, words that spoke to him deeply. Bob and I spent some time
seeking to grasp the complex implications of the following text, which we
studied the day before he died.
To understand this somewhat opaque piece from the Babylonian Tal-
mud, it is necessary to know the following:
1. There is a biblical law that forbids wearing clothing made of a com-
bination of linen and wool, which combination is known as shaatnez.
2. The talmudic rabbis made a clear and interesting distinction between
legislation that was biblicial-i.e., divine in origin-Mitzvot Mid'Oraita,
and legislation that was rabbinic-i.e., human in origin-Mitzvot
Mid'Rabbanan. The relationship between these two modes of legislation
informs the following selection from tractate Berachot (19B).
Ray Yehudah taught in the name of Ray, "If a person discovers
that his clothes are woven of shaatnez, linen and wool, he must im-
mediately remove them even if he is in a crowded marketplace."
What is the reason for this? Answer: "In the presence of God,
human wisdom, understanding, and prudence count for nought"
(Proverbs 21:30). Wherever divine authority is spurned, no respect is
paid even to a teacher.
But consider the following rabbinic dictum: "Great is human dig-
nity since it actually overrides a biblical prohibition." Does it actu-
ally override a biblical prohibition? Should we not rather apply the
rule, "In the presence of God, human wisdom, understanding, and
t Director, Hillel Foundation, and Jewish Chaplain, Yale University.
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prudence count as nought"? And, in any case, what specific biblical
prohibition might be overridden in deference to human dignity?
Ray Bar Shaba answered this question for a group of students in
the presence of his colleague, Ray Kahanna. Human dignity, he ex-
plained, overrides the biblical prohibition against disobeying the
judges, cited in the Book of Deuteronomy (17:11), "You shall act in
accordance with the instructions given you and the ruling handed
down to you; you must not deviate from the verdict that they [the
judges] announce to you either to the right or the left."
The students laughed at Ray Bar Shaba, for they could discern no
reason why this biblical prohibition might bow to human dignity
more than any other. If a judge teaches a biblical law, they reasoned,
surely no one is permitted to transgress it (Rashi, ad. loc.).
Ray Kahanna rebuked them, "A great man has spoken. Do not
laugh at him! All the rabbis have understood their right to legislate
as deriving precisely from this biblical prohibition. Yet when
rabbinic legislation is challenged by the claims of human dignity, the
rabbis always give priority to human dignity."
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